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Abstract  
In this contribution to a phenomenology of social network sites (SNS), we see how the share button brings about 
an alteration in our being-with others. On the side of the sharer, we see an experience of the world in a mode of 
possible retroactive sociality, creating an enigma in the constitution and attention of the subject of a given 
experience. On the side of the receiver, we see how being shared with creates sometimes unwelcome 
retrospective ideation of the sharer’s experience, and requires a choice whether, by liking or commenting, to 
bring the sharer into retroactive awareness of having been experiencing the shared alongside the receiver. Only if 
and when the shared has been received and the reception has been shared is asynchronous being-with at a 
distance constituted. 
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A Phenomenology of SNS Sharing  
In this contribution to a phenomenology of social network sites (SNS), we see how the share button 
brings about an alteration in our being-with others. Similar phenomena have already been observed 
and theorized in other media, as in despatialized simultaneity and the decoupling of time and space 
(Thompson, 1995), remote connectivity in a mobile private sphere (Papacharissi, 2010), connected 
presence (Campbell and Park, 2008), and the space of flows (Castells, 2000). While the focus of this 
paper is SNS sharing, it is hoped that the analysis will be of a kind fundamental enough to be clearly 
applicable (although perhaps sometimes in different and incomplete ways) to these similar modes of 
mediated construction of shared experience. 
The analysis takes place against the background of Heidegger’s consideration of loneliness, and its 
goal is, first, to explicate the process whereby SNS allow the construction of asynchronous shared 
experience, and, second, to demonstrate that some of the user experiences resulting from sharing are 
rightly characterized as “shared experience” in a substantial sense. 
Heidegger (1962) argues that it is only because our mode of being is fundamentally social—Dasein is 
always already Mitsein—that it is possible for us to be lonely. Loneliness follows from the ontic 
condition of not being with others of a being that is ontologically being-with others; loneliness, then, is 
being-with in a negative mode. 
SNS “sharing” allows two or more persons to experience an object of attention together 
asynchronously and at a distance. Typical objects of such shared experience include an article or 
website, a song or video, or an image—as for example a funny cat picture, or a photograph of one’s 
meal. The construction of a shared experience of this object of attention consists schematically of two 
processes, joined together by the technically necessary but experientially unrelated process of SNS 
posting: (1) the initial experience of the sharer prior to sharing and (2) the subsequent experience of 
the receiver following sharing.  
(1). The pre-sharing experience of the sharer is an experience of the present as potentially at a later 
time retrospectively experienced by another as having been experienced along with the sharer, hence 
representing a distinct and unprecedented intermediate between the negative mode of being-with in 
loneliness and the positive mode of being-with in community. This is a novel experiential presence of 
the modal category of the possible, whose resolution into actual presence or non-presence of others is 
determined in the future—in Ihde’s (1990) phenomenology of human-technology relations, it appears 
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as an asynchronous form of embodiment technics, but which produces an enigma position within the 
constitution and attention of the subject ((I/We-)-technology à world), forming an opposite extreme 
to his alterity relation (I à technology-(-world)).  
Once habituated to the possibilities of retroactive construction of shared experience presented by SNS, 
we carry our networks along with us as persons or groups whom we are potentially in the future to 
have currently been with. The misspelled store sign we see now is experienced no longer as something 
that would have been funny to experience with an absent friend, but as something which is funny to 
potentially be retroactively currently experiencing with an absent friend—should we only choose to 
photograph and share it with that friend. This is similar to the internal narrativization of daily 
experience in anticipation of the possibility of later recounting to friends who may be concerned with 
or amused by the events experienced, but is substantially different in that sharing constructs the object 
itself as subject to shared experience, while narrative recounting can aim only towards an “as if” 
presence of the object of experience to the other. In the case of projected posterior narration, we ideate 
the later retelling as a layer placed on top of the current experience, whereas in the potentially shared 
experience we ideate the retroactive gaze of the absent friend through the very lens of our camera 
phone as an added co-present subjectivity—and this ideation affects our experience whether or not we 
choose, in the end, to post the picture. 
(2). In the reception of the shared object of attention, the receiver experiences the object alongside a 
retrospective ideation of the sharer’s initial experience, which, however, is only experienced as 
potentially knowingly along-with the receiver, again representing an intermediate between negative 
and positive modes of being-with. When the receiver experiences the shared object she projects 
backwards the sharer’s experience of the object. She may seek to reconstruct the sharer’s experience in 
asking, for example, what’s supposed to be funny about it, or perhaps whether the sharer shared this as 
something to be celebrated and enjoyed or something to be lamented. In any case, if she considers 
indicating receipt of the shared object through commenting, liking, or sharing the post, she must 
imagine not only the sharer’s experience of the object, but the sharer’s ideation of the receiver’s 
experience of the object—roughly speaking, she must imagine the experiencing-together of the object 
by the sharer and the receiver. The retrospective construction of such a shared experience may be 
meaningful, creating a mutual feeling of warmth and closeness, or may even be highly disruptive, as in 
the case of a parent who comments upon a child’s drunken photograph. 
The technical act of SNS sharing, being related only externally to the sharer’s experience of something 
as to be shared, often fails to reach all and only the ideationally intended recipients. While for the most 
part and for most users this is a feature rather than a bug, allowing for collateral benefits in accidental 
contributions to the maintenance and development of untargeted relationships, the receiver may be 
forced to engage in unwelcome ideation of the sharer—“who is my cousin such that she shared this?”; 
“does my former student really think this is funny?”—or may simply have been invited by implication 
into a group, context, or event of a too-intimate nature. 
This transgressive form of sharing (“oversharing”), which creates a retrospective ideation of being-
with the sharer against the will and preferences of the receiver, has a parallel in a transgressive form of 
receiving a shared experience. Having been accidentally included as potential recipient of a shared 
event, the recipient can create retroactive co-presence in the past experience against the will and 
preferences of the sharer. The parent may know full well that he is not among the community of 
intended recipients of the child’s post, and by replying to it may rightly be called a “creeper.” Both 
parties must recognize that the merely external relation between the ideational and technical acts of 
sharing creates accidental moments of publicity, which call for civil inattention (Goffman, 1971). In 
an offline example of these mirrored forms of transgression, while it is surely transgressive to use the 
bathroom with the door open while company is over, it is also surely trangressive, having accidentally 
walked into the bathroom in use, to assume that one has implicitly been invited to stay. 
Only once the shared has been received and the reception has been shared is asynchronous being-with 
at a distance constituted—the circle must be closed at both ends, otherwise consisting only of an 
abstract and generic being-possibly-with on the part of the sharer and a being-merely-alongside on the 
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part of the receiver. By articulating these moments in the construction of asynchronous shared 
experience at a distance through SNS sharing we can see the intricate and rich modulations of being-
with resulting from what we might call—following Heidegger’s analysis of loneliness—the sudden 
ontological being-online of our lives, in which synchronous, monomodal offline life is merely a 
negative mode of synchronous, multimodal being-online. 
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